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Putting the Puzzle Together
J. de N. Kennedy's Official History 
of Munitions and Supply
K A T H R Y N  R O S E
Abstract: This article details the great difficulties J. de N. Kennedy faced 
in writing the official history of the Department of Munitions and Supply 
in the late 1940s. The very elements of its success -  rapid and inspired 
improvisation in response to the early crises in the war -  resulted in 
disorganized and incomplete records. Kennedy moreover had to work 
against a nearly impossible deadline as the department, a wartime 
creation, shut down in 1948-1949.
T h e  C a n a d i a n  g o v e r n m e n t  sponsored official histories of its involvement in the Second World War. The gold standard may 
well be the volumes (1955, 1960) of C.P. Stacey, who had become 
official army historian in 1940. About the time Stacey was publishing 
The Canadian Army 1939-1945 (Governor General’s Award, 1948), 
he was vetting a late draft of the official history of the Department 
of Munitions and Supply by its legal chief, John de Navarre Kennedy 
(1950). The books by the two men differ dramatically in tone and 
content. Stacey offers information, along with analysis and assessment, 
while lawyer Kennedy cites briefs, lists, and statistics to document 
activity at Munitions and Supply, but does little by way of analysis 
or explanation.
For his herculean mission, Kennedy was short on munitions 
(consistent, comprehensive records) and supplies (time and money). 
From his department’s inception in 1940 on, no one had organized 
its records systematically. Late in the war, in 1944, Liberal Prime
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Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King set up what became the 
Public Records Committee (p r c ) to organize the government’s war 
record. In 1946, the p r c  selected Kennedy as official historian for 
Munitions and Supply -  as head of the department’s Legal Branch 
since 1940, he knew its operations and internal connections intimately. 
But Munitions and Supply had already merged with the Department 
of Reconstruction and was winding down as the government reduced 
its wartime size and scale, so the p r c  pushed Kennedy to work fast 
and finish soon.1
Organizing wartime records and completing a manuscript quickly 
might well have challenged even someone with substantial historical 
training and experience. Kennedy’s assignment reveals the complex 
interplay between the writing of official history and the problems 
of keeping war records. Munitions and Supply (1940-1945) was the 
only truly wartime department, starting with the outbreak of war, 
and continuing into the postwar to aid with reconstruction efforts. 
It started without a record-keeping tradition similar to its federal 
counterparts, expanded dramatically and flexibly, and lacked clear 
guidelines for managing paperwork, which its branches, divisions, other 
units, and crown corporations handled in their own way, if at all. 
The department was winding down, which complicated the historian’s 
search for documentation, and the p r c  did what it could to help.
SUPPLYING A WAR
Munitions and Supply began to emerge through orders in council 
and legislation amid the increasing tension in Europe in the summer 
of 1939. Parliament passed the Defence Purchases, Profits Control
1 Jack de Navarre Kennedy, The History of the Department of Munitions and Supply: 
Canada in the Second World War, vol. I, Production Branches and Crown Companies 
(Ottawa: Edmond Cloutier, King’s Printer and Controller of Stationery, 1950); History 
of the Department of Munitions and Supply: Canada in the Second World War, vol. II, 
Controls, Services and Finance Branches, and Units Associated with the Department 
(Ottawa: Edmond Cloutier, King’s Printer and Controller of Stationery, 1950). “John 
de Navarre Kennedy,” in Canadian Who’s Who?, vol. IV (Toronto: Trans Canada 
Press, 1948), 502. Brooke Claxton, the new minister of national defence, wanted to 
cancel the official histories programme by March 1948. After Claxton was prodded 
by Lester Pearson, and encountered an angered C.P. Stacey, Stacey’s project was 
renewed. See Tim Cook, Clio’s Warriors: Canadian Historians and the Writing of the 
World Wars (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2006), 142-143.
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and Financing Act, in effect July 1939, to manage and control 
domestic industries producing defence materiel. This law centralized 
procurement through the Defence Purchasing Board (d p b ) , which 
had “exclusive power to enter into contracts for the purchase of 
munitions and the construction of defence projects.”2
After Canada went to war in September 1939, the government 
launched the department and restructured the board,3 but, uncertain 
what Canada might be contributing to the Allies’ efforts, proceeded 
cautiously.4 In October 1939, it transferred the d p b ’s  powers and 
responsibilities to the War Supply Board (w s b ), a temporary agency 
with “greater freedom of action and authority” vis-a-vis munitions 
and war supplies.5
After King and the Liberals secured a new majority in March 
1940, Parliament passed the Department of Munitions and Supply 
Act on 9 April. The minister took over the w s b ’s  work, but with 
power to conscript war materiel and set prices and conditions.6 The 
new minister was Clarence Decatur “C.D.” Howe, an American-born 
engineer who had made his fortune in Port Arthur, Ontario, building 
grain elevators where railways from the west met ships at the head of 
Lake Superior. He had won a seat in the 1935 election that replaced 
R.B. Bennett’s Conservatives with King -  prime minister for most 
of the 1920s -  and the Liberals. Howe became in 1936 minister of 
transport and soon one of King’s most trusted cabinet colleagues, 
able to complete difficult projects.7
At Munitions and Supply, Howe selected a committee of prominent 
figures in business and industry -  Henry Borden, R.A.C. Henry, 
Gordon Scott, and Edward Plunkett “E.P.” Taylor -  to bring in 
business skills and communicate with private industry.8 Bill Bennett 
became his secretary; G. Kingsley Sheils, the deputy minister, set up9 
the department’s Registry Office.10
2 Kennedy, History, I, 4.
3 Robert Bothwell and William Kilbourn, C.D. Howe: A Biography (Toronto: 
McClelland and Stewart, 1979), 123.
4 Ibid.
5 Kennedy, History, I, 5.
6 Library and Archives Canada (LAC), RG 28-A, vol. 48, Structure and Operation 
of the Canadian Department of Munitions and Supply, 22 April 1941.
7 Bothwell and Kilbourn, Howe, 128.
8 Scott would later fall victim to a torpedo attack on the SS Western Prince.
9 Kennedy, History, I, v.
10 Bothwell and Kilbourn, Howe, 130-132.
3
: Putting the Puzzle Together J. de N. Kennedy's Official History of Munitions and Supply
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2015
Minister’s office and senior management. [Kennedy, History, I, back insert, dated 3 June 1944].
Munitions and Supply started to expand just as major parts of 
western Europe fell to the German army in the spring of 1940. In 
May, the British Expeditionary Force lost much of its equipment in 
its cross-Channel retreat from Dunkirk in France. Britain turned 
to Canada for much of its materiel, and Howe’s department started 
to process orders as quickly as possible, with little time to establish 
procedures as staff began to mobilize private industry and gather 
materiel. By 1943, the department had 26 branches, 19 controls, 
and 28 crown companies.11 See the following pages for more charts 
detailing this expansion.
11 Ibid., 133-4; Kennedy, History, I, xvii.
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Howe set up the War Industries Control Board (w i c b ) in June 
1940 to ensure the supply and allocation of supplies for war needs. 
Starting off with only a few members appointed by Howe, as the war 
effort expanded and the needs for materiel increased, the challenges 
of uncoordinated activities, and conflicts, increased. In August 1941, 
a set of w i c b  Regulations was passed that centralized the activity of 
the boards under an appointed chairman.
The 17 controllers for the various industries and the wartime 
administrator for the Canadian Atlantic ports sat on the w i c b  to 
coordinate the actions of the controls. By enrolling representatives 
from machine-tool, metals, oil, power, steel, and timber producers, 
among others, Howe could take control of whole industries and 
acquire aircraft, ammunition, artillery, rifles, shells, ships, tanks, and 
trucks.12 Board representatives could “buy, expropriate, manufacture, 
ration and, generally ... take such steps as might be necessary to 
further the war effort in their respective fields of operation.”13
A PATCHWORK QUILT
This large network did not standardize or centralize administration. 
Nine service and finance branches ran the department, 16 production 
branches manufactured war materiel, controls regulated scarce war 
supplies, and crown corporations avoided bureaucracy.14 Another 
category -  units associated with the department -  included the 
Auditor-General’s Office, the Canadian Mutual Aid Board, the 
Cost Inspection and Audit Division, the Inspection Board of the 
United Kingdom and Canada, the Treasury Office, the War Assets 
Corporation, and the War Contracts Depreciation Board.
The finance branches were home to the Financial Advisor; the 
Comptroller’s Branch oversaw accounting issues for all units; and 
the Economics and Statistics Branch dealt with records, facts, and 
statistics.15 The services branches included the General Counsel’s 
Office and Legal Branch, the Industrial Security Branch, the Labour
12 Bothwell and Kilbourn, Howe, 136.
13 Kennedy, History, II, 2.
14 Robert Bothwell, “Department of Munitions and Supply,” Canadian Encyclopedia 
online <10 April 2014>.
15 Kennedy, History, II, 296.
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Units Reporting to Coordinator of Controls.
[Kennedy, History, I, back insert, dated 3 June 
1 94 4].
Units Reporting to Deputy Minister. [Kennedy, 
History, I, back insert, dated 3 June 1944].
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Liaison Office, the Organization and Personnel Branch, the Publicity 
Branch, and the Secretary’s Branch.
Crucial to our purposes, the Secretary’s Branch oversaw 
correspondence, and the Registry Office (or central registry) kept the 
files; together, they managed records under16 Deputy Minister Kingsley 
Shiels. The Registry Office received, recorded, and distributed 
incoming correspondence and dispatched outgoing mail; this function 
started with one clerk and by 1943 employed 200 people.17 It also 
kept records, creating, recording, and storing files.18
In November 1942, at the prime minister’s urging, the Privy 
Council instructed departments to prepare records for the writing 
of war narratives.19 Cabinet Secretary Arnold Heeney asked them 
about the state of the art just as20 Munitions and Supply had begun 
absorbing the files of branches and crown corporations into its 
central registry. In the first four months of 1943, the Registry Office 
took over the files and filing staffs of Construction Control, Metals 
Control, Munitions Contracts, Rubber Control, Shipbuilding, Signals 
Production, Steel Control, and the w i c b  Secretariat.21 Registry 
personnel found a diversity of records and increasing mismanagement 
and, while not wanting to “interfere with the work of the Branches 
and Controls,” had to adapt the materials before incorporating them.22 
They attempted to encourage and facilitate better record keeping 
throughout the department, with some success.
There were other problems. In the rush of war, “new employees 
without any knowledge of government routine were pouring into 
the department, setting up their own filing systems and generally 
disregarding established Government procedures.”23 Space too was 
becoming an issue. Some organizations had “no official files ... Old 
files have been accumulating in vaults and other store rooms.”24
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid., 397.
18 Ibid.
19 LAC, RG 19, vol. 526, file 129-43, A.D.P. Heeney to J.L. Ilsley, 4 November 1942.
20 LAC, RG 19, vol. 526, file 129-43, W.O. Clark to Donald Gordon, 16 November 
1942, refers to Heeney’s message (note 19) and quotes it at great length.
21 LAC, RG 28-A, vol. 5, Quarterly Report -  Central Registry: Quarter Ending 
June 1943, 11 June 1943.
22 Ibid.
23 LAC, RG 28-A, vol. 17, Secretary’s Branch: Record of Development of Secretary’s 
Branch, 15 September 1943.
24 LAC, RG 28-A, vol. 59, Quarterly Report -  Central Registry: Quarter Ending June
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Units Reporting to Financial Advisor.
[Kennedy, History, I, back insert, dated 3 June 
1944].
Units Reporting to Coordinator of 
Production. [Kennedy, History, I, back insert, 
dated 3 June 1944].
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The chaotic record-keeping at Munitions and Supply and in 
other federal departments and agencies worried senior members of 
government. The Canadian Historical Association and senior public 
servants had been encouraging the prime minister to act. As a result 
of his close friendship with former Dominion Archivist and passionate 
collector, Sir Arthur Doughty, King was no fan of Dominion Archivist 
Dr. Gustave Lanctot and questioned his ability to preserve and 
protect Canada’s wartime record. King invited several senior civil 
servants to oversee preparation of wartime department histories. 
In June 1944, the Privy Council created the Interdepartmental 
Advisory Committee on Public Records to consider how to preserve 
this material throughout the government.25 By September 1945, this 
“temporary” body had become the Public Records Committee (p r c ), 
and Munitions and Supply sent two representatives -  R.T. Donald 
and W.J. Neville.
With a push from the p r c , the department’s Registry Office 
kept merging files. In December 1944, department staff members 
discussed how to handle and store dormant records, and how to 
classify records from the former Industry and Sub-Contract Co­
ordination Branch and the Plan Records Divisions. Integrating these 
files added 1,278,573 items to the registry.26 With the still rising 
demands for war materiel, the filing system continued to expand 
at a rapid pace. In 1943, the Registry Office created 121,900 new 
files on various topics.27 So much did demands for materiel increase 
during 1944 that in the final quarter of that year, the registry created 
127,573 new files, more than the total for the year before.28
The p r c  did not do away with the central registry’s difficulties -  
incomplete collections, missing files and information, and the continuing 
problem of “Branches and Divisions withholding correspondence from
1943, 11 June 1943; LAC, RG 35, series 7, vol. 8, Secretary of State, Memorandum 
to the Cabinet: Committee on Public Records, 10 September. 1945; George Brown, 
“The Problem of Public and Historical Records in Canada,” Canadian Historical 
Review 25, no. 1 (March 1944), 1.
25 LAC, RG 28-A, vol. 59, Central Registry: Quarterly Report as of December 1944.
26 LAC, RG 28-A, vol. 59, Central Registry: Quarterly Report as of December 1944, 
31 December 1944.
27 Ibid, Report for the Secretary’s Branch Presented to Staff Meeting on January 
19th, 1944, 19 January 1944.
28 LAC, RG 28-A, vol. 59, Central Registry: Quarterly Report as of December 1944.
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the regular files,”29 resulted in significant gaps. No one oversaw this 
enormous expansion with a view to writing a history.
In April 1945, Secretary of State Norman McLarty, a member 
of the p r c , asked C.D. Howe to establish records policies across 
the department. The minister contacted a number of branches but 
merely30 requested information, rather than promoting effective 
policies, thereby reducing the long-term accessibility of records and 
the value of the eventual history.31
AN IMPOSSIBLE ASSIGNMENT
On 31 December 1945, Munitions and Supply merged with 
Reconstruction as Reconstruction and Supply. Three months later, 
the p r c  approved its request for an official historian.32 Legal Branch 
chief John (“Jack”) de Navarre Kennedy had a great deal of support 
from the p r c  and Deputy Minister Sheils. He was to outline the 
“evolution of the department, the difficulties encountered and 
experience gained, and provide suggestions and recommendations 
for future procedure.”33 This direction was certainly in line with the 
p r c  ’s mandate.
Kennedy was born in London, England, in 1888, son of a barrister 
who became a police magistrate in London. He completed an m a  at 
Cambridge in 1909 and was called to the bar in British Columbia 
in 1918 and in Ontario in 1921. He joined Munitions and Supply in 
1940 as director general of the Legal Branch.34 He became officer of 
the Order of the British Empire (o b e ) in 1945, King’s Counsel (k c ) 
in 1947, and county court judge in Peterborough, Ontario, in 1952. 
He died in 1979.
29 LAC, RG 28-A, vol. 59, Central Registry: Quarterly Report, March 1945, 30 
March 1945.
30 LAC, RG 35, series 7, vol. 8, C.D. Howe to Norman McLarty, 10 April 1945.
31 Ibid.
32 LAC, RG 35, series 7, vol. 5, W.E.D. Halliday, Memorandum to the Public 
Records Committee, 4 May 1949.
33 Ibid., W.E.D. Halliday, Memorandum to Mr. Heeney -  Reconstruction and 
Supply: Preparation of Narratives, 19 January 1948. At the request of Secretary of 
State for External Affairs Lester Pearson in the autumn of 1948, an order in council 
of 19 January 1949 appointed Heeney his undersecretary (deputy minister).
34 “John De Navarre Kennedy,” in Canadian Who’s Who?, IV, 502; “John de 
Navarre Kennedy,” www.thepeerage.com <10 March 2014>, 254.
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Kennedy was certainly familiar with the department’s work, but 
he faced a considerable task. Unlike C.P. Stacey, he was not a trained 
historian, but a lawyer and a writer of fiction.35 He had not organized 
and preserved the records he would need as Stacey had done since 
1940, or have the kinds of relationships with key individuals that 
Stacey enjoyed at National Defence. He was, moreover, to write a 
history of an almost-defunct department. From the start, the p r c  
was pressing him hard, and he had little opportunity to establish firm 
working relations with its members. His minimal interaction with the 
p r c  and the department helps explain the development of the history.
Kennedy immediately realized that to understand thoroughly 
the department’s complex organization, he needed to engage all the 
senior officials, but many of them ignored his inquiries. Some had no 
interest, held other priorities, or had destroyed relevant files.36 As p r c  
Secretary Halliday explained to Arnold Heeney in January 1948, “It 
had been taken that the historical records of the units would be in 
good order but this had not proved to be the case; some units had 
no historical records and others only for a limited period, therefore 
a great deal of additional material had to be collected from various 
sources.”37 Evidence suggests that the minister’s lack of interest in 
records and history may have set the tone.
By December 1947, Kennedy had completed an outline that 
included a preface by the minister, an introduction of the senior 
officers, and a foreword. In early 1948, Halliday noted that Kennedy 
had found that “some units had no historical records at all, and 
others only went up to the end of 1943 and most of such records were 
in poor shape.”38 On six units, Kennedy had nothing: Aero Meters 
Limited, the Clothing and Textile Production Branch, the Eldorado 
Mining and Refining Company Limited, Toronto Shipbuilding Co. 
Limited, the War Contracts Depreciation Board, and the Wartime 
Administrator of Canadian Atlantic Ports. Facing such poor records,
35 By 1940, he had published In the Shadow of Cheka (Toronto: Macauly Company, 
1 9 3 5 ) and Crime in Reverse (London: T. Nelson, 1939). He would go on to publish 
The Rain of Death (London: T. Nelson, 1945), and Aids to Jury Charges (Toronto: 
Canada Law Book Company, 1975).
36 Halliday, Memorandum to Heeney, 19 January 1948.
37 Ibid.
38 LAC, RG 35, series 7, vol. 7, Committee of the History of the Department of 
Munitions and Supply, 15 Dec. 1947; LAC, RG 35, series 7, vol. 5, W.E.D. Halliday, 
Memorandum to Mr. Gibson -  Public Records Committee, 20 January 1948.
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Kennedy obtained summaries of wartime activity from branch heads. 
He had little control over the content provided.39
Short of staff and time, Kennedy could do little additional research. 
When Kennedy accepted the project, he was given $10,000 in March 
1946. By the start of 1948, Kennedy had nearly spent this allocation 
in its entirety. “Unanticipated work collecting material, the discovery 
that certain historical records were not in good order or unavailable 
and other factors had entailed substantial and unexpected increase 
in the time required and consequently the expenditure.”40 The p r c  
passed a submission to the Privy Council to increase the allocation 
from $10,000 to $20,000.41
By 1948, Reconstruction and Supply was closing down. W.E.D. 
Halliday wrote to Deputy Minister C.P. Edwards in February 1948, 
reminding him about the responsibility to maintain records, outlining the 
rules about departmental records, and recommending action. Halliday 
and the p r c  were already discussing how to dispose of the department’s 
business and solicitation files and the records of the War Assets 
Corporation, and the transfer of the remainder to National Defence.42
In early October 1949, Kennedy met with Halliday and Stacey 
to discuss the history. The reason for Halliday’s involvement was to 
explain how the Public Records Committee supported the efforts of 
other departments in writing wartime narratives. “I read to him the 
various suggestions the Committee had made to departments to assist 
in this work, pointing out the desirability of having a confidential 
section which would be as objective as possible, analyze errors for 
the future guidance of the government.”43 Halliday commented in the 
file that Kennedy was forthcoming in his conversation regarding the 
challenges he faced in completing the work. “Mr. Kennedy was very 
cooperative ... he mentioned that there had been considerable delays 
and that he had not had adequate clerical staff ... It had proved
39 Halliday, Memorandum to Heeney, 19 January 1948; LAC, RG 35, series 7, vol. 
5, C.P. Stacey, Memorandum to DHS, File, 6 October 1949.
40 LAC, RG 35, series 7, vol. 5, W.E.D. Halliday, Memorandum to the Public 
Records Committee: Reconstruction and Supply; narrative of Munitions and Supply; 
further additional expenditure, 4 May 1949.
41 Ibid.
42 LAC, RG 35, series 7, vol. 5, W.E.D. Halliday to Commander C.P. Edwards, 5 
February 1948.
43 LAC, RG 35, series 7 vol. 5, W.E.D. Halliday, Note for File: Munities and Supply 
Narrative, 7 October 1949. Halliday explains in the document that he met with 
Kennedy on October 6th.
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extremely difficult to extract required information from the files. 
Consequently, the narrative is uneven in content and style.”44 After 
what Halliday considered a productive discussion, Kennedy agreed 
to collaborate with the p r c , and submit anything he prepared to 
Halliday for advice, “so that the final work would be in line with the 
wishes of the Public Records Committee.”45
C.P. Stacey was far less optimistic after his meeting with Kennedy. 
When the two met on 5 October 1949, the book was already in page 
proof, which “of course made any major improvements in it extremely 
difficult.”46 Yet improvements were needed. The manuscript read like 
a reference text; it conveyed nothing of the department’s dynamic 
wartime growth. It lacked footnotes to primary source material and 
references to departmental files and relied solely on officials’ narratives. 
Stacey worried, “It will not be a good book which can be relied on 
with confidence as a well-grounded record of events.”47 Stacey felt that 
“this history will be of only limited value,” as it was the “result of no 
experienced historian having been consulted until the book was already 
set in type.”48 There were large sections that Stacey could not review, 
as they had already been sent to the University of Toronto Press, in 
Kennedy’s effort to reach completion as expeditiously as possible. “It 
was quite possible that it will still be exposed to severe criticism when 
published,” despite the efforts of the p r c  and Heeney.49
Kennedy explained to Halliday and the p r c  that the departmental 
files were too voluminous and disorganized to be useful. He did not 
have research assistants or much time. He welcomed the opportunity 
to improve the project, accommodating Stacey’s suggestions as much 
as possible.50 Nevertheless, the pressure to finish the project before the 
department closed resulted with Kennedy submitting the manuscript 
prematurely, leaving little opportunity for changes.51 Both volumes of 
the official history appeared the next year.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
46 LAC, RG 35, series 7, vol. 5, C.P. Stacey, Memorandum to DHS, File, 6 October 1949.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
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THE OFFICIAL HISTORY
C.P. Stacey was right to worry. The two volumes are uneven in their 
treatment of the department’s various controls, branches, and units, 
as Kennedy relied on the contributions of branch heads. Each chapter 
outlines a unit’s wartime activities, presents various statistics, and 
describes processes. The volumes do not refer to documentation or to 
the individuals who conducted the processes. There is little indication 
of how the units interacted with each other and with the whole.
The University of Toronto published Kennedy’s history as a two- 
volume set. The introduction to Volume I: Production Branches and 
Crown Companies tries to place each of the department’s elements 
within its wider context of wartime activities, but this is the only 
place that paints the broader picture. In the remaining chapters, each 
branch and company is treated in isolation, and the treatments differ 
widely. There are two sections in volume one, one for the Production 
Board and the production branches it coordinated, and the other to 
cover the Crown Companies.52 The chapters on the 17 production 
branches present details on the types of materials they produced or 
manufactured, their rates of manufacturing, their costs for producing 
material, and their volume of orders. A  few chapters append rates 
of production. For the branches of the board that had divisions, 
there is a brief description of activities and contributions. However, 
the treatment is inconsistent. The 33-page chapter on the Chemical 
and Explosives Production Branch details the types of chemicals it 
produced, its research and development activities, its yearly production, 
and the subsidiaries that supplied raw materials. By comparison, the 
six-page chapter on the Defence Projects Construction Branch merely 
describes, briefly, construction of aerodromes, barracks, fortifications, 
and other defence projects.
The second section of volume one consists of 27 chapters on the 
crown companies created by the department during the war. These 
companies were incorporated to solve production problems and 
“surmount certain supply, purchasing and administration difficulties. 
They also provided a legal entity familiar to business men and 
permitted a degree of decentralization.”53 Eleven of the companies 
operated plants, and the rest carried out supervisory, administrative, 
and purchasing functions. Kennedy states that the goal of the
52 Kennedy, History, II, 286.
53 Ibid.
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section was to provide an outline of some of the duties, problems and 
achievements of these organizations.
In Volume II: Controls, Services and Finance Branches, and 
Units Associated with the Department, there is a chapter on each of 
these 35 entities that endeavours to provide “an outline of some of the 
duties, problems and achievements.”54 For example, the short chapter 
on the Aircraft Control includes the reasons for its establishment, the 
manner of its implementation, its development, its handling of surplus 
materials, its sale of surplus aircraft, and its conclusion of activities 
at war’s end, as well as a timeline of orders in council and relevant 
dates. Even though “the activities of the [Aircraft] control grew far 
beyond the original purposes for which it had been created,” the 
chapter does not elaborate.55
The chapter on the Chemicals Control suffers from similar 
shortcomings. In twenty-six pages, it explains how it managed supplies 
of various important chemicals and outlines demand for and uses of 
a number of them.56 It also includes a section on pharmaceutical 
chemicals for the war and the control’s efforts in this area, as well as 
an extensive timeline and a chart of volumes of chemicals.57
Kennedy was well aware of the challenges his manuscript 
presented, but he understood the constraints of its creation. p r c  
Secretary Halliday appreciated his frustration. He noted in October 
1949 that Kennedy “was not entirely satisfied with the nature of the 
book as being uneven in its style and content.”58
The problems that plagued development of the department’s 
history were substantially the result of inconsistent record keeping in 
many of its elements during the war. It is difficult to blame officials 
for overlooking administrative procedures at the start of the war, for 
the government rushed the department into existence to respond to 
a crisis. Despite the central registry’s attempt in 1943 to merge files 
and impose standards, many units could not or did not respond, 
and the situation remained chaotic. The Department of Munitions 
and Supply was just too large and dispersed for the Registry Office 
to start imposing standards late in the war. The Public Records
54 Kennedy, History, II, 2.
55 Ibid., 23.
56 Ibid., 26-33.
57 Ibid., 47-51.
58 Memorandum to DHS file, 6 October 1949.
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Committee encouraged development of a thorough and consistent 
historical narrative of the department and its constituent elements 
by supporting Kennedy and offering him Stacey’s assistance. Even 
with Kennedy and the p r c ’s  understanding of the problems, however, 
neither could overcome the inherent administrative limitations of the 
department, but the end result was at the very least a useful chronicle 
of and guide to a complex, jury-rigged contraption that none the less 
worked very effectively.
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